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The facts
Chris Cairns, a former New Zealand international
cricketer, brought proceedings against the former
chairman of the Indian Premier League, Lalit Modi, for
remarksthathehadmadeonhisTwitteraccountaccusing
Cairns of having taken part in match fixing or that there
were strong grounds to believe that he had done so while
playingintherivalIndianCricketLeague.Thedefendant
broughtproceedingsforaninitialhearingonthegrounds
that a real and substantial tort had not occurred within
the United Kingdom on the basis that the extent of
publication within the United Kingdom was limited and
that an action would be an abuse of process under the
principle of Jameel v Dow Jones & Co Inc.
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It was remarked in Jameel that:
“It would not be right to permit this action to
proceed.Itwouldbeanabuseofprocesstocontinue
to commit the resources of the English court …
where so little is at stake.”
2
The claimant contended that the evidence of publication
ofthetweetwassufficienttopasstheJameelhurdlewhile
inanyeventthequestionofsubstantialitywasnotmerely
down to the number of publications as it also required an
assessment of the seriousness of the allegation and its
capacity to damage the claimant.
The court took evidence from two experts in the field
who provided evidence as to the number of individuals
that would have seen the tweet. The defendant expert
anticipated the number as 35, on the basis of the total
number of followers, of whom a percentage were in the
United Kingdom, of whom not all would have seen the
remark when made. The claimant expert contended that
the actual number was higher and closer to 100 on the
basis of followers and other methods of dissemination.
3
The judgment
MrJusticeTugendhatheldthatthenumberofpublications
in the instance was not speculative and insufficient, as
there was more to an abuse of process than simply the
number of publishees. A claimant’s primary concern in
an action for defamation is vindication and not damages
for harm suffered in the past. Vindication can come in
the form of a retraction, verdict for the claimant or a
public apology, and as a result the claimant can
legitimately and reasonably pursue a claim where the
publication has had a limited number of publishees and
hisaimistopreventfurtherdissemination.
4Theclaimant
resided in the United Kingdom and expected to return to
live there again and therefore had a reputation to protect
in the United Kingdom.
Tugendhat J. remarked that:
“[A]claimantcanlegitimatelyandreasonablypursue
a claim where the publication that has already
occurred is limited, when his purpose is to prevent,
or at least limit, further publications to a similar
effect being made in the future.”
5
The sensationalist nature of the remark being made on
Twitter along with the fact that the pair of individuals
involved were prominent members of the cricket
communitymeantthatthelikelihoodofthecontentbeing
republished was a great one.
As a result, the court held that there had been
substantial publication of the defamatory remarks as it
was anticipated that it went beyond the mere number of
individuals that would have seen it following the
defendant. At the same time as the purpose of an action
was vindication, the fact that the publication might be
borderline was not a decisive factor. As a result, the
claimantwasallowedtheopportunitytobringproceedings
against the defendant for the tweet.
Comments
The decision can be seen as hugely valuable in two
contexts: one, for reaffirming that the primary purpose
of actions of defamation is to vindicate the damage done
to the claimant’s reputation by remarks. One might
suggest that the purpose of cases of defamation was
starting to be perceived as primarily financial redress,
especially in light of the development and potential
damage done by the web. The development of the web
hasmeantthatthereachofaremarkisfargreaterinterms
of numbers than before, allowing a claimant the greatest
opportunity to bring an action in the jurisdiction most
friendly to him, traditionally the United Kingdom, for
seeking financial redress, but Tugendhat J.’s words
articulate that vindication and not damages is the key.
The second aspect to come out of the decision was the
fact that the actual number of publishees of a particular
defamatory remark was not key but the potential number
being significant would be sufficient. The decision to
move away from being able to articulate exactly how
many publications of a defamatory remark occurred is a
reflection of the continued modernity of technology. The
extent of publication in the case of a tabloid magazine
canbedeterminedtoanextentbythenumberofphysical
copies of the magazine in question sold; however, there
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it can be retweeted by any individual, regardless of
whether they follow the user or not, or can be searched
for.
The move away from actual publishee numbers and
the strengthening of the concept of vindication is a
reflection of the development of social web technologies
online. Their aim is that the largest number of people
interact and collaborate with one another beyond
traditional relationships. The ability to determine
publishees is greatly reduced but, regardless, vindication
needs to be settled. It is likely that this decision is going
to be among the first as social web technologies continue
to develop and the number of cases of defamation
continue to rise.
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